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Resumen: In this paper the author replies to the criticisms formulated in Teoria politica 2 (2012) in the section ‘Metaethics and Politics’ against his position on the relationships among metaethics, legal theory and political liberalism. He takes this opportunity for clarifying several definitions and thesis, responding to Patricia Mindus. As a way of a reply to Pierluigi Chiassoni and Luigi Ferrajoli the author looks for a space of convergence for distinct metaethics streams, with the aim of preserving a role for reason in moral argumentation. More specifically, Guastini advocates that moral reasoning is irrational and therefore this element is criticized. Incidentally the author intends to provide more arguments in favour of the necessity to endorse a minimal ethical objectivism as a background of our more convincing theories of political liberalism and democracy.
Palabras clave: Metaethics. Moral Objectivism. Moral Scepticism. Moral Rationalism. Political Liberalism.